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CHAPTER 3 
 
Multilevel party politics of immigration: territorial rescaling and party 
competition 
 
Eve Hepburn 
 
[A] Introduction 
Immigration is one of the most pressing concerns in Western democracies, becoming 
a key source of polarization amongst publics and political parties (Boswell, 2003; 
Odmalm, 2012). However, while the integration of immigrants is increasingly 
managed by substate government levels as demonstrated by Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
and Fiona Barker in chapter 2, thereby becoming an important issue in the agendas of 
substate territorial actors as we shall see below, studies of immigration have focussed 
almost exclusively on the central or national(-state) level. This represents a significant 
gap in our understanding of the party politics of immigration in multilevel states. 
States are no longer (if they ever were) homogenous political entities with the same 
statewide parties competing over the same statewide policy issues across the entire 
space of a given country. Instead, we have witnessed a dramatic decentralization of 
powers to substate territories, which have enabled regional political actors to advance 
distinct policy agendas to cater for regional interests, leading to policy divergence 
across states (Loughlin, 2001; Keating, 2001). This has been described as spatial or 
territorial ‘rescaling’, whereby power and authority is dispersed across several 
territorial levels within states (Keating 2009). In response, political parties have 
themselves undergone degrees of territorial rescaling, by transforming themselves 
from unitary organizations to decentralized multilevel beasts (Deschouwer, 2003; 
Hopkin, 2003; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2006; Thorlakson, 2006; Fabre, 2008; 
Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010). As a result, substate regional branches are allowed to 
fashion their own policy programmes and campaigns in order to cater to the interests 
of the regional citizenry, and to compete with home-grown regional parties which 
may advocate greater self-determination for the territory. Often, this requires parting 
from central-party policy to develop more appropriate policies for the region. 
Therefore, in similarity to the levels of government themselves, as Zapata-Barrero and 
Barker have shown us, different levels of political parties may also adopt more 
synchronized or combative/divergent positions on immigration policy matters. 
The territorial rescaling of states has led to increasing policy differentiation 
and divergence across states, as regions seek tailored policy solutions to regional 
problems (Keating, 2009). Yet so far, studies have focussed on traditional social 
policy issues such as childcare, health, or education, whereby regional parties have 
‘broken’ from central-party agendas to meet the specific socioeconomic and cultural 
needs of the substate region. However, immigration represents another key policy 
issue that has become decentralized in certain states – especially in relation to migrant 
integration – leading to possibilities of regional policy divergence. Furthermore, 
immigration has become a source of competition between political parties at the 
substate regional level, and to that end it deserves attention. Focus on the multilevel 
party politics of immigration has been generally lacking from the literature (see 
Zapata-Barrero, 2009a; Hepburn, 2009b), and the aim of this chapter is to begin a 
discourse that seeks to redress this imbalance.  
One primary explanation for this lack of attention to substate-state party 
dynamics – not only in immigration matters but also in other policy areas – is that the 
dynamics of regional party systems are often distinct from state-level party systems. 
In particular, regional party systems are often influenced by a ‘territorial cleavage’, 
which in some cases takes prominence over the left-right dimension (Hepburn, 2010). 
This cleavage revolves around three issues of territorial concern:  
 
(1) the politics of territory, that is, issues of political autonomy, self-
determination and representation within state structures (here, parties often 
take positions along an independence—unitarism continuum);  
 
(2) the culture of territory, such as issues of language, identity and culture 
(here, the main polarizing issue tends to be language, whereby, in the case of 
the existence of a regional minority language, parties take positions along a 
unilingualism—bilingualism continuum); and  
 
(3) the economics of territory, whereby parties may support increasing 
subsidies from the state or increased economic autonomy (thereby taking 
positions along an economic dependence—autonomy continuum).  
 
These three dimensions of ‘territorial interests’ interact with issues of immigration 
and demographic change in particular ways at the substate regional level that diverge 
from state-level norms. Regarding the territorial politics of immigration, regional 
parties may welcome immigrants into the ranks of the substate region (which may 
also constitute a stateless nation) to bolster the ranks of territory and thereby demands 
for more self-determination, or alternatively, they may perceive immigrants as 
political agents of the centre, send to weaken demands for self-government or 
independence (Hepburn, 2009b; Banting and Soroka, 2011). On territorial cultural 
interests, regional parties may view immigrants as a threat to the culture and 
traditional way of life of the region/nation. In particular, when the region has its own 
language, immigration can be seen as ‘diluting’ the linguistic ranks of the territory. 
This is especially true if the language is perceived to be ‘threatened’ by the expansion 
of the dominant national (statewide) language (Kymlicka, 2001; Zapata-Barrera, 
2007). Alternatively, parties may view immigrants as enriching the culture of the 
substate region or stateless nation is they endorse a multicultural vision of society. 
Finally, on the issues of territorial economic interests, regional parties may view 
immigration as a way to bolster the regional economy by filling particular skills gaps 
in the labour force, or alternatively, they may perceive immigrants as taking jobs from 
the locals (see Dustmann, 2003). 
Yet the effects of territory are not only restricted to the regional level. Various 
dimensions of the territorial cleavage (political, economic, cultural) may also become 
key issues within the statewide party system. This may occur when a statewide party 
that has a strongly concentrated support base in a particular region, seeks to highlight 
the problems of that region by placing it on the national political agenda. Perhaps 
more common is when a stateless nationalist or regionalist party (SNRP) advances its 
territorial claims within the statewide electoral arena. In short, both statewide parties 
and regional parties may develop strategies at multiple levels – regional, state and 
(beyond the scope of this collection), Europe – to address issues of territory. And 
these territorial issues interact with immigration in several ways. As the statewide 
level, parties must account for the uneven settlement and impact of migrants across 
different parts of the country: i.e. migrants tend to settle in urban rather than rural 
regions. As a result, migrant integration takes different forms in different places, 
which parties must address. The decentralization of party structures also enables 
regional branches of parties to approach immigration in distinctive ways, which may 
involve developing a custom-made regional approach to migrant integration. This 
may be especially important if the region also considers itself to form a ‘nation’ with 
a claim to distinctiveness. In this case, regional elites may be preoccupied with 
promoting a distinctive nation-building project and conception of citizenship that 
diverges from, or even conflict with, the state-building project.   
This chapter seeks to develop an explanatory framework for understanding 
multilevel party competition on immigration issues. It begins by considering the 
general trend towards territorial rescaling, and the effect of this on parties and party 
systems. It then goes on to examine classical theories of party competition, in 
particular the spatial and ownership theories, before examining two issues that do not 
conform to left-right ideological polarization: territory and immigration. The chapter 
then examines how the issues of immigration and territory interact in multilevel party 
systems, with a particular focus on the neglected regional level. Following this, the 
chapter explores how parties – including statewide parties (and their regional 
branches), and stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) – have adopted 
distinctive stances on immigration at different levels, which are often influenced by 
their positions on the territorial cleavage. This final section puts forward several 
possible explanatory factors, which are then tested in the case studies, for why 
political parties adopt different positions on immigration at different territorial levels; 
in particular, why regional party stances may differ from statewide party responses.  
 
[A] Theories of Party Competition 
Immigration has become a key source of political conflict in Western democracies 
(Boswell, 2003; Lahav, 2004; Koopmans, et al 2005; Odmalm, 2012). However, there 
is still a shortage of comparative research on the salience of immigration in the policy 
agendas of political parties, which is still generally perceived as a ‘niche’ issue (see 
Meguid, 2008; Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012). Furthermore, there is a dearth of 
research on how political parties at the regional level compete on immigration. Most 
approaches to party competition still tend towards a ‘state-centric’ bias, emphasising 
ideology as the critical axis upon which parties compete.  
Political parties are commonly classified and differentiated from one another 
by their location on a left-to-right spectrum, conventionally ranging from Marxism at 
the extreme Left, with Fascism at the extreme Right. In the late 1950s, Downs (1957) 
developed a ‘proximity theory’ of party competition. He argued that parties compete 
by taking diverging positions along a set of issue dimensions, based on the 
assumption that voters will support a party whose position on an issue most closely 
resembles their own. More specifically, they will ‘strive to distinguish themselves 
ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions’ (Downs 
1957: 126-7). This is more likely in proportional electoral systems than majoritarian 
systems, whereby the greater number of parties in the PR system encourages parties to 
distinguish themselves more clearly, and possibly more radically, on policy ground.  
Building upon Downs’ analysis, Sartori (1976) argued that party competition 
arises from the extent to which parties differ on ideological grounds, i.e. the existence 
of ‘left-right polarization’. This means that party systems, which are understood as 
‘the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition’ (Sartori 1976: 44), 
can be categorized by the number of ideological ‘poles’ upon which parties pivot, and 
the ‘distance’ between parties on a left-right continuum. Party systems are ‘bipolar’ if 
there are two ideological poles around which parties obtain support, and ‘multi-polar’ 
if support pivots along various points along a left-right continuum. Other scholars, 
however, have argued that there are dimensions other than ideology which are 
important in party competition, such as issues relating to gender, race, sexual 
orientation, Europe, immigration and the environment. Yet even then, ideology is still 
seen as a ‘multiple-ordering dimension’ under which other issues are accommodated 
(Maor and Smith, 1993). Other scholars contend that the salience of a given issue may 
be just as important as the ideological distance between parties in determining the 
way they compete. Budge and Farlie (1983) argue that parties seek to make their 
concerns most prominent in campaigns, rather than emphasising how their position on 
an issue is distinguishable from other party positions. In ‘owning’ certain issues, 
parties will attract those voters who are concerned with this issue (so left-wing parties 
emphasize social welfare whilst right-wing parties are seen to ‘own’ the issue of law-
and-order). However, the ‘ownership’ approach, as conceptualized by Budge and 
Farlie and focussed exclusively on socioeconomic matters, is unable to account for 
issues that are not associated with a particular left-right ideology.  
Territory is one such ‘issue’, whereby constitutional change or the defence of 
territorial interests may be pursued by any or all of the main ‘class-based’ parties, as 
well as regionalist and green parties (Hepburn, 2010; Alonso, 2012). A growing body 
of literature in nationalism and regionalism studies has shown that political activity 
often pivots around issues of culture, language, boundaries and self-determination 
(Lynch 1996; De Winter and Tursan 1998; Jones and Keating 1995; Keating 2001). 
The territorial heterogeneity of states, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) is a 
result of territorial cleavage ‘structures’ and different patterns of political conflict in 
different places. These territorial cleavages have never gone away, despite the 
modernizing and centralizing impulses of modern nation-states. Indeed, some scholars 
have argued that the territorial cleavage is now experiencing a renaissance as states 
decentralize (Hough and Jeffery 2006; Swenden and Maddens 2008; Hepburn 2010). 
This has led political parties to take greater account of issues of territory in their 
political agendas, encouraging them to contest the ‘ownership’ of the territorial 
dimension (alongside other left-right dimensions) in multilevel states (Alonso, 2012).  
In particular, a certain type of political party – the stateless nationalist or 
regionalist party (SNRP) – has made the issue of territory its pièce de résistance 
(Hepburn, 2009a). These parties have been defined as ‘geographically concentrated 
peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes the 
democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition’ (Muller-Rommel, 
1998). The defining characteristic of these parties is the demand for territorial 
empowerment, which often includes the goal of self-determination (De Winter and 
Türsan, 1998; Hepburn, 2009a). In particular, SNRPs are distinguished by three 
characteristics: (1) they are organized within a given territory; (2) they seek to 
represent a population which shares a common identity; (3) their strategies aim to 
secure territorial self-determination (de Prat 2002). Importantly, SNRPs span a range 
of ideological positions, including the extreme left (Scottish Socialist Party), the 
centre left (Eusko Alkartasuna), the centre right (Convergencia i Unio), and extreme 
right (Vlaams Belang). Indeed, some scholars have argued that SNRPs are the only 
party family in Europe that is located across the entire left–right dimension (Tronconi, 
2005; Gomez-Reino, 2008; Hepburn, 2009a).  
Immigration is another such ‘issue’ that is not associated exclusively with a 
particular ideology. As Odmalm (2012: 1) argues, ‘immigration “messes” up party 
classification…Parties that are supposed to be on the ‘Right’ are suddenly on the 
‘Left’ (and vice versa) once immigration is taken into account.’Although early 
research made a connection between immigration and far-right populist parties, which 
campaigned primarily on an anti-immigrant platform, several recent studies have 
shown that immigration has become a concern of all mainstream parties (Mudde, 
2007; Davis, 2012; Odmalm, 2012). For instance, Van Spanje (2010) identified a 
‘contagion effect’ of anti-immigrant parties, whose electoral success influences other 
parties’ policy positions on immigration. In an analysis of 75 parties within eleven 
West European states, he found that the policies of left-wing parties were as 
influenced by anti-immigrant parties as right-wing parties. As such, he posits that 
anti-immigrant parties have a contagion effect on entire party systems (Van Spanje 
2010). Alonso and Da Fonseca (2012) have shown that the immigration issue has 
gained saliency in the agendas of both centre-right and centre-left parties, so that the 
positions of both have been converging in an anti-immigrant direction in the face of 
electorally successful far-right parties. Further research has shown that the adoption of 
anti-immigrant positions by the mainstream parties has, in turn, facilitated anti-
immigrant success. Dahlström and Sundell (2012) demonstrate that mainstream 
parties legitimize anti-immigrant parties by taking a tougher position on immigration. 
Clearly, immigration has become a key concern across the party system in Western 
states, not only influencing the rise of far-right parties, but also affecting the policy 
agendas of mainstream left and right parties. 
However, while these developments can be identified at the state level, might 
one discover a rather different set of findings when examining the effects of 
immigration on substate party systems? The following section will explore how the 
twin issues of territory and immigration may produce a different set of outcomes at 
the substate level, as opposed to the state level. 
 [A] Immigration, Regions and Territorial Interests 
The trend towards regionalization and federalism within many states means that 
substate electoral arenas have become important focal points for territorial interest 
representation (Jeffery 1997; Hough and Jeffery 2006; Marks et al 2008; Keating 
2009). Decentralization has led to the creation of regional executives and parliaments, 
regional policy communities and regional electoral arenas. In long-standing federal 
states such as Austria, Canada and Germany, as well as newly decentralising or 
federalising states in the UK, Spain, Italy and Belgium, substate tiers of government 
have accumulated extensive executive, legislative and fiscal powers that lie outside 
the control of the state. This has resulted in the empowerment of the regional level, 
and the development of regionally specific policies to address regional concerns.    
As a result of territorial rescaling, immigration has become not only an 
important issue and policy competence at the state level; it has also become key 
concern for substate regions, some of which are steadily gaining increased powers 
over immigration policy. However, the substate regional level has so far been 
virtually absent in the field of immigration studies, despite the fact that it is 
increasingly responsible for the social, economic and cultural integration of 
immigrants (see Joppke and Seidle, 2012).  Where there has been research done on 
party competition on immigration, scholars have focussed exclusively on the state 
level (Meguid 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Alonso and da Fonseca 
2012; Odmalm, 2012; Davis 2012). Party competition at multiple territorial levels of a 
state is a field of research that has barely been touched by scholarship. Yet the trend 
towards decentralization and federalism within OECD states means that substate 
assemblies have been empowered with control over large sections of social, 
environmental and economic policy, including health, education, housing, culture, the 
environment, planning and economic development (Keating, 2001; Loughlin, 2001; 
Marks et al 2008). These policy areas ‘overlap’ with immigration, which tends to be 
controlled by the ‘centre’ – that is, the state government. They overlap because 
immigration affects the substate region’s demographic growth, labour market, 
economic development and the delivery of public services (such as schooling, health 
and social care, and housing). Furthermore, as the case-studies in Part II of this 
volume demonstrate, some substate regions have also been allocated direct 
competences for immigrant integration. As such, and as the case-studies in Part III 
show, regional parties have increasingly taken a stance on immigration issues, despite 
this being a policy area traditionally determined by the centre (Hepburn, 2009b).  
The way in which territory influences party positioning on immigration 
becomes all the more heightened in states of a multinational (or ‘plurinational’) 
nature, which may or may not contain stateless nationalist and regionalist parties 
(SNRPs). Most debates on immigration assume ‘that the receiving society and the 
receiving state coincide’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2007:3). However, this is certainly not the 
case in multinational states, in which one or more stateless nations, with their own 
language, culture and political identity, exist within the shell of the state. For Banting 
and Soroka (2012: 157), ‘the existence of multiple and potentially competing political 
identities can complicate the integration process. This is particularly the case if the 
central state and the substate nation promote different conceptions of citizenship and 
different nation-building projects – in effect, competing for the affections of 
newcomers’.  
Furthermore, immigration presents particular challenges for stateless nations 
within multinational states that have distinct political identities and cultures as 
Zapata-Barrero and Barker made clear in chapter 2 (see also Kymlicka, 2011). 
According to Banting and Soroka (2012: 157) ‘immigration into the homeland of 
national minorities such as Quebec, Flanders or Catalonia can … generate added 
tensions. Such immigration has the potential to dilute the culture of the national 
minority, affect the prospects for nationalist mobilization, and upset historic balances 
between the substate nation and the majority in the country as a whole’.  
Finally, stateless nations may use their devolved powers not only to also to 
assert their autonomy vis-a-vis the central government, but also to highlight their 
‘distinct society’ claims by defining their own conditions for immigrant integration. 
This may include special conditions for access to permanent residence or citizenship 
(which may be more restrictive of more liberal than that at the state level).   
 
[A] Immigration and Parties in Multilevel States 
So how have political parties operating within multilevel states responded to the issue 
of immigration, and to what extent has it become entwined with issues of territory? 
Have regional immigration concerns influenced statewide-level debates?  And have 
statewide immigration concerns influenced regional-level debates? Indeed, has 
immigration become an important point of competition, or even polarization, between 
substate parties at all – be they nationalist, regionalist, conservative, socialist, liberal 
or green? Finally, to what extent (if at all) have SNRPs and regional branches of 
statewide parties differed from central parties in their approach to immigration? 
Most obviously, the issue of immigration integration is a fundamental concern 
to stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs). As we saw above, SNRPs are 
primarily focussed on the goals of territorial empowerment, which includes seeking to 
protect or maintain the identity, culture and interests of the regional population, and to 
obtain greater autonomy for the region based on its (cultural, linguistic, historical, and 
political) distinctiveness – a priority that distinguishes them from statewide parties 
(for a fuller description of SNRPs see Hepburn, 2009a). As such, immigration poses a 
particular challenge for SNRPs to include ‘non-nationals’ in their region- or nation-
building projects. In particular, immigration may be perceived by SNRPs as posing 
distinct challenges for preserving regional identities, cultures and languages. 
Traditionally, SNRPs have sought to defend these territorial interests from 
encroachment by the ‘centre’, that is the majority population of the state. Immigrants, 
in opting to integrate into the majority culture by learning the majority language, for 
instance, may be included in the perceived threat of the centre by SNRP (Zapata-
Barrero, 2007). However, if immigrants choose (or are required) to integrate into the 
minority culture and learn the minority language of the region, then SNRPs would 
presumably view immigrants in a more positive light as the ranks of the minority 
region have been augmented. SNRPs have also been among the greatest critics of 
statewide immigration policies and advocates of greater regional control of 
immigration policy. To that end, SNRPs have often taken their demands to the 
statewide level, arguing for a decentralization of state immigration systems. 
Yet immigration has also become an important policy issue for regional 
branches of statewide parties, which must respond to the immigration concerns of 
SNRPs while at the same time maintaining a coherent immigration policy across 
different levels of the multilevel state. As noted above, one important characteristic of 
substate party systems is that statewide parties must operate in a peculiarly regional 
context, and compete on regional issues. This has led to intra-party demands for the 
organizational decentralization of political parties (Detterbeck and Renzsch, 2003; 
Fabre, 2008; Wilson, 2009; Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010). Furthermore, it has been 
well-documented that political parties operating at the substate regional level often 
diverge in their policy agendas from parties at the nation-state level on issues such as 
education, healthcare and immigration (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001).  
Importantly, the decentralization of political parties may lead to intra-party 
conflict as different levels of parties diverge in the areas of policy, campaigning, and 
their activities in public office. For instance, the Quebec Liberal Party, Catalan 
Socialist Party and Scottish Labour Party have all – to varying extents – sought to 
distinguish (or even separate) themselves from their statewide counterparts over 
contested policy issues, including multiculturalism and social policy. Furthermore, in 
cases where statewide parties must compete with SNRPs – such as Flanders, 
Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and Northern Italy – regional branches have sometimes 
adopted stronger territorial positions, including support for greater autonomy, to 
defuse support for secession as well as to exert greater control issues that strongly 
affect regional populations such as immigration (Fabre, 2008; Hepburn, 2010, 2011). 
In particular, if immigration becomes a key concern of SNRPs in their development of 
a nation-building project, then it must also become a concern of regional branches of 
statewide parties. This is because they too need to be seen as representing ‘territorial 
interests’ and defending the interests and identity of the territory (from potential 
external threats) (Hepburn, 2009a). Furthermore, regional party positioning on 
territorial issues may be motivated by attempts to align the party with public opinion 
(i.e. support for greater self-determination for the region). However, it may also 
demonstrate a ‘gap’ with public opinion on issues they consider to be best decided at 
the elite level (and here, the positions of party leaders on immigration often diverge 
from those of party followers – on the Spanish case, see Zapata-Barrero, 2009b). 
Of course, there is no straightforward correlation between territory and 
immigration in determining party competition, as there is no straightforward 
correlation between ideology and immigration (Odmalm, 2012) or territory and 
ideology (Hepburn, 2009a). SNRPs and regional branches of statewide parties have 
responded in various ways to the challenges and opportunities associated with 
immigration. ‘Whilst some parties have welcomed immigration as a way of boosting 
their economies and expanding and diversifying national membership, other parties 
have rejected immigration as a threat to the labour market, and argue that it will 
undermine and fragment the national community’ (Hepburn, 2009b). There is a need, 
therefore, to examine the positions of SNRPs and regional branches of statewide 
parties on immigration, and to explore to what extent they are distinctive from the 
positions of national-level parties, and why. As this discussion has sought to 
demonstrate so far, the context in which regional parties compete on immigration may 
be very different from that of the statewide level. This is because, as we saw above, 
the dynamics of regional party systems are often distinct from those of statewide party 
systems, due to the distinctive nature of the regional political culture and economy. In 
particular, regional party systems may be strongly influenced by a territorial cleavage, 
with parties taking distinct positions on self-determination, the protection of cultural 
identities, languages, and traditional economies. This would lead us to assume that 
regional parties might adopt quite different positions on immigration from statewide 
parties in multilevel states.  
 
[A] Identifying Explanatory Factors for Regional/Statewide Positions on 
Immigration 
The following section seeks to provide an explanatory framework for understanding 
the positioning of regional and statewide parties on immigration, and for identifying 
potential areas of divergence between the two. It develops several hypotheses to 
account for the immigration stances of national parties operating in statewide systems 
on one hand, and SNRPs and regional branches of statewide parties operating at the 
substate level on the other. These factors are: (1) demographic issues; (2) economic 
issues; (3) linguistic/cultural issues; (4) party ideology; (5) electoral system; (6) party 
polarization; and (7) the relative degree of government control over immigration 
policy. This list is certainly not exhaustive and there may be other specific factors that 
account for party positioning on immigration in particular countries. Instead, it seeks 
to identify general factors that explain the positioning of parties within multilevel 
states. Furthermore, not all of these variables may be applicable for one case; instead, 
it is anticipated that there may only be one or two (clusters of) explanations for party 
positioning on immigration at a particular time in a particular case.  
 
[B] 1. Demography 
A first factor that could account for divergence between statewide and regional party 
positions on immigration relates to the overall demographic situation of the state in 
question, and the specific demographic position of the region within that state. 
Demographic status includes: current levels of immigration to the state/region, the 
direction of migratory trends, and the (forecasted) stability of the state/regional 
population. On the first matter, if a state has received high overall levels of 
immigrants, then it is more likely that statewide parties adopt more restrictive stances 
on immigration; alternatively, in cases where a state has received low numbers of 
immigrants, parties are likely to have a more positive approach based on a greater 
need to attract and/or retain skilled immigrants. Regional parties are likely to adopt 
similar positions to statewide parties unless (1) the region has received significantly 
higher levels of immigration compared to the national average, in which case regional 
parties are more likely to advocate less immigration than statewide parties; or (2) the 
region has received lower levels of immigration compared to the national average, in 
which case regional parties will take more pro-immigration stances than statewide 
parties. On the second issue, in states that are net importers of immigrants, statewide 
parties are likely to have more restrictive stances that states that have high levels of 
out-migration, as population decline may be a concern in the second scenario. 
Similarly, regional parties may adopt more restrictive/open positions on immigration 
based on the in-migration and out-migration of the region. Linked to that, parties are 
more likely to adopt positive approaches towards immigration if long-term 
demographic decline (owing to low fertility rates or an ageing population) are forecast 
for states; in contrast, states that have flourishing demographic rates are more likely to 
incite positions from statewide parties that the territory is ‘full up’ and requires no 
further immigration. Again, regional parties are likely to adopt similar positions 
unless the region faces long-term demographic decline compared to the national 
average, in which case regional parties may take more positive positions than 
statewide parties. On the basis of this analysis, we can hypothesize that: 
 
H1.1 Immigration is viewed positively by statewide parties if there are low 
levels of immigration and demographic decline; and negatively if there are 
high levels of immigration and robust demographic levels. 
 
H1.2 Immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if there are low 
levels of immigration to the region and demographic decline compared to the 
national average; and negatively if the region received significantly high 
levels of immigration on top of already robust demographic levels.   
 
[B] 2. Economy 
A second potential explanatory variable for statewide and regional party positioning 
on immigration is economic. To put it simply, in poorer states that have a skills 
shortage in the labour market, statewide parties are more likely to support increased 
immigration, in particular targeting migrants that possess certain labour-market skills 
that are required by the national economy to sustain economic growth. In contrast, 
wealthy states that are performing well and have no labour shortages are unlikely to 
demand increased immigration. Regional parties are likely to adopt similar positions 
to statewide parties unless (1) the regional economy is much weaker than the national 
economy as a whole and there is a significant labour shortage, encouraging parties to 
view immigration as necessary to boost growth; or (2) the regional economy is much 
stronger than the national economy as a whole, causing regional parties to see no need 
for further immigration. Based on this, we can hypothesize that:   
 
H2.1 Immigration is viewed positively by statewide parties if the national 
economy is in decline and there a labour shortage; and negatively if the 
national economy is flourishing and there is no labour shortage  
 
H2.2 Immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if the regional 
economy is underperforming compared to the national average and there is a 
significant labour shortage; and negatively if the regional economy is 
outperforming the national economy and there is seen to be no regional 
labour shortage.  
 
[B] 3. Linguistic and Cultural Barriers 
Third, language and culture – and the extent to which they present ‘barriers’ to 
migrant integration – may be an important determinant of statewide and regional 
parties’ positions on immigration. In particular, statewide parties may be opposed to 
immigration if the current immigrant population has been shown to have had 
difficulties learning the national language. Similarly, linguistic proficiency in the 
minority language of the region is also a key barrier for becoming a citizen of the 
region, in cases where the language of the region differs from the language of the state 
(i.e. French in Quebec, English in the rest of Canada; Catalan or Basque versus 
Castillian in the rest of Spain). Regional parties may therefore oppose immigration if 
they believe it would reduce the size of the regional population who speak the 
minority language, whereby minority-language speakers would be threatened or 
‘submerged’ within the state. This may happen in cases whereby immigrants choose 
to adopt the language of the majority (rather than the minority) for reasons of social 
mobility. In contrast, regional parties are more likely to welcome immigrants if (1) 
they are already fluent in the minority language or willing to learn it; or (2) if there 
are strong immigration requirements/education policies in place for the region, which 
encourages migrants to integrate into the culture, language and identity of the region.  
 
H3.1 Immigration is viewed positively by statewide parties if immigrants share 
and/or learn the national language; and negatively if immigrants are shown to 
have difficulties/opposition to learning the national language. 
 
H3.2 Immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if immigrants make 
efforts to learn the regional minority language; and negatively if immigrants 
speak/adopt the majority language of the state, rather than the minority 
language of the substate region/nation. 
 
[B] 4. Party Ideology 
A fourth factor determining a statewide or regional party’s stance on immigration is 
its ideological profile. Some scholars have argued that left-wing parties favour more 
pro-immigrant multicultural stances while right-wing parties are more traditionalist 
and anti-immigrant (Jupp 2003; Lahav 2004), which is just as relevant for statewide 
as regional parties. Of course, as shown above, immigration rarely maps neatly onto 
parties’ ideological profiles (Odmalm, 2012). Often parties themselves are split on the 
issue of immigration (Zaslove, 2004). However, we will still put this forward as a 
possible hypothesis to be tested in the case of both statewide and regional parties: 
 
H4.1 Immigration is viewed positively by (centre-)left statewide and regional 
parties 
 
H4.2 Immigration is viewed negatively by (centre-)right statewide and 
regional parties  
 
[B] 5. Electoral System 
A fifth factor that may influence the positioning of statewide and regional parties on 
immigration is the structure of the electoral system. Studies have shown that 
majoritarian or ‘first past the post’ systems tend to punish extreme policy positions, as 
they are usually based on competition between two dominant parties, with the 
creation of single-party governments that have a majority in parliament (see Odmalm, 
2012). In this scenario, we would expect to see that majoritarian systems produce a 
dynamic of party competition that converges on a moderately pro-immigrant position. 
In contrast, electoral systems based on proportional representation encourage a wider 
variety of policy positions, including more extreme positions, with the resultant 
creation of coalition governments. In this scenario, proportional systems may increase 
polarization between parties, thereby encouraging parties to adopt more anti-
immigrant positions. These hypotheses apply to both regional and statewide parties:  
 
H5.1 Immigration is viewed more positively by statewide and regional parties 
in majoritarian electoral systems that discourage polarization 
 
H5.1 Immigration is viewed more negatively by statewide and regional parties 
in proportional or mixed-member electoral systems that encourage 
polarization 
 
[B] 6. Party Polarization 
It is also worthwhile separating out party polarization as an additional explanatory 
factor, as polarization is influenced not only by the electoral system, but also by the 
types of parties competing. In particular, the existence of electorally relevant anti-
immigrant parties – which have appeared in all types of electoral system – may 
increase polarization and push other parties to a more anti-immigrant position 
(Dahlstrom and Sundell, 2012). Even in cases where anti-immigrant parties do not 
compete, if there is a high degree of polarization, i.e. parties taking extreme opposite 
views on the issue, this may create a negative climate on immigration. Finally, the 
existence and position of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties on immigration 
may also influence party competition. If SNRPs adopt a negative attitude towards 
immigration, this may have a ‘contagion’ effect on regional branches of statewide 
parties; however, in cases where SNRPs adopt a positive position on immigration, this 
may encourage regional branches to adopt more liberal stances on immigration. So: 
 
H6.1 Immigration is viewed positively by statewide and regional parties if 
there are low levels of party polarization on immigration (in particular, if 
there is no electorally successful anti-immigrant party competing in the party 
system); and negatively if there are high levels of party polarization on 
immigration (in particular, if there is an electorally successful anti-immigrant 
party competing in the party system) 
 
H6.2 Immigration is viewed positively by regional parties if the predominant 
SNRP is in favour of immigration; and negatively if the predominant SNRP 
opposes immigration, resulting in a contagion effect. 
 
[B] 7. Policy Control over Immigration 
Our final factor explaining why regional parties may adopt diverging positions on 
immigration compared to statewide parties is the extent to which immigration has 
been decentralized in multilevel states. This is not an issue in unitary states. In cases 
where a region has no competence or control over the levers of immigration there is 
often demand for more powers in this area, at least in the area of immigrant 
integration, which affects other regional competences such as health, education, 
housing. In such cases, regional parties may unite in calls for more powers over 
immigration, reducing polarization on the issue, and acting as a ‘territorial bloc’ in 
opposition to statewide parties. However, in cases where a region has a high degree of 
control over immigration, such as determining a regional points system, then there 
may be more contestation over how to manage the details of the policy controlled by 
the regional government, resulting in more polarization on immigration. In short, 
regions lacking immigration powers may experience low contestation/polarization on 
immigration, while regions with maximum control over immigration may experience 
high contestation/polarization. This leads us to hypothesize that: 
 
H7.1 Immigration is viewed positively by regional political parties if the 
region has limited control over immigration policy, resulting in low levels of 
contestation and polarization on immigration policy 
 
H7.2 Immigration is viewed negatively by regional parties if the region has 
extensive control over immigration policy, leading to high levels of 
contestation and polarization on immigration policy 
 
[A] Conclusion 
The decentralization and federalization of states has created or strengthened regional 
party systems in which regional political parties may adopt distinctive positions on 
policy issues that ‘break’ from the national party line. The issue of immigration is no 
exception. Despite being a policy traditionally controlled by the central-state 
government, the impact of immigration on areas of regional competences – such as 
the delivery of public services, economic development and social cohesion – as well 
as the decentralization of policy competences in the sphere of migrant integration –
has encouraged regional political parties to adopt stances on immigration based on the 
needs and interests of the regional citizenry, society and economy that diverge from 
the positions of statewide parties. In particular, the existence of a ‘territorial cleavage’ 
based on political, economic and cultural territorial interests (such as demands for 
self-determination and protection of minority languages) intersects with immigration 
in particular ways at the substate level. This leads to the possibility of quite diverse 
stances of regional parties on immigration compared to national statewide parties.  
This is especially true if there is an electorally successful stateless nationalist 
or regional party (SNRP) operating in the substate territory. The SNRPs party family, 
given its focus on the preservation of regional cultures, languages and economies, has 
an important stake in determining who is considered part of the region or nation. 
Although the focus in the literature has overwhelmingly been on radical-right 
responses to immigration (parties which focus mainly on the threats to national-state 
identities), it is no less important to stateless nationalist regionalist parties, which seek 
to build their own nations and protect regional cultures and identities.  
In some cases, immigration may be viewed as a threat to the culture, identity 
and language of the substate region/nation in question. However, in others, SNRPs 
may view immigration as a positive development that increases the ranks and clout of 
the substate region/nation. As such, there is no direct correlation between 
nationalism/regionalism and immigration. SNRPs have adopted a variety of 
approaches on immigration, ranging from outright xenophobic and anti-immigrant 
stances, to valorizing immigrant-origin groups as an important resource for the 
stateless nation or region. SNRPs do, however, tend to have a clear effect on the 
positions of their competitors: regional branches of statewide parties. In similarity to 
anti-immigrant parties, the stances of SNRPs on immigration (as well as territory – 
that is, demands for self-determination) may have a ‘contagious’ effect on other 
parties. So if a SNRP adopts a positive position on immigration based on the 
territorial needs of the region/nation, this may colour the views of other parties to 
adopt positive approaches. Contrarily, if a SNRP adopts a negative position, they, like 
the anti-immigrant parties themselves, may encourage other parties to become 
restrictive. 
As the dynamics of regional party systems often differ from the dynamics 
of statewide party systems, there is a need to explore how immigration is viewed 
by parties at both levels, in particular the under-researched regional level, and how 
party stances at both levels might diverge and intersect. This chapter has sought to 
address this need, by developing a general explanatory framework for regional and 
statewide party positioning on immigration. In particular, it has developed several 
hypotheses to account for party competition in multilevel states, drawing on 
socioeconomic, cultural and political determinants. These hypotheses will be used 
to form the basis for the empirical chapters in Part III of the book. Contributors to 
the Political Parties section have been encouraged to draw selectively on the 
hypotheses presented above in their own cases. But rather than requiring all 
authors to test all of the hypotheses in their case(s), we have invited them to 
engage with the hypotheses in a way that reflects the importance they attribute to 
different explanatory variables in their particular case(s). This will allow individual 
authors to examine a particular argument or proposal in greater depth. Beyond this 
volume, it is also hoped that these hypotheses will prove useful for other scholars 
wishing to explain immigrant positions in single or comparative case studies, and 
will encourage future work on multilevel immigration approaches that challenge 
the assumption that immigration is an exclusively ‘national’ issue. 
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